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FOCUS ON INNOCENCE IN CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW AND ADVOCACY
CAROL S. STEIKER"& JORDAN M. STEIKER**

INTRODUCTION

Over the past five years we have seen an unprecedented swell of
debate at all levels of public life regarding the American death penalty.
Much of the debate centers on the crisis of confidence engendered by the
high-profile release of a significant number of wrongly convicted inmates
from the nation's death rows. Advocates for reform or abolition of capital
punishment have seized upon this issue to promote various public policy
initiatives to address the crisis, including proposals for more complete DNA
collection and testing, procedural reforms in capital cases, substantive limits
on the use of capital punishment, suspension of executions, and outright
abolition. Advocates for the retention and vigorous use of capital
punishment have been sympathetic to some, but by no means all, of these
proposals. Disagreement over the nature and scope of responses to the
crisis has inevitably and quite properly led to debate about the significance
of the wrongful conviction of the innocent in the administration of capital
punishment.
This symposium presents two common criticisms of the current focus
on innocence in the debate over the death penalty in America-one from an
"agnostic" on the issue of capital punishment and one from a whole-hearted
supporter. Professor Ron Allen, the self-described agnostic, along with his
co-author Amy Shavell, makes the argument often made by supporters of
capital punishment that there is nothing distinctive about the problem of
wrongful death in the capital punishment context. Rather, the execution of
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some innocent people is simply the unavoidable cost of implementing
capital punishment and thus is comparable to the foreseeable deaths that
occur whenever the government undertakes an important social project,
such as building a bridge or constructing a dam.' Joshua Marquis, a vocal
and high-profile supporter of capital punishment, criticizes those who focus
on the problem of innocence in the death penalty debate for overstating the
problem by overestimating the actual number of completely innocent
people convicted and sentenced to die. According to Marquis, the true
number, while not zero, is low enough to constitute an acceptable cost of a
2
valuable social policy.
Although it is not our focus in this paper to refute them, we think that
these common critiques of innocence are deeply flawed. Allen & Shavell's
critique completely misses at least two distinctive harms that flow from
executing the innocent. First, unlike the innocent victims of governmental
bridge-building, those who are innocent and sentenced to death suffer the
additional devastation of being blamed for a terrible crime; their names,
families, and entire lives are forever tainted by such ignominy, quite apart
from the death of their bodies. Moreover, when such errors are discovered,
as some but by no means all of them eventually will be, they deeply
undermine the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. This latter
cost, though unquantifiable, is tremendously important. Public fear of
unjust violence at the hands of the state, which has a monopoly on the
legitimate use of force, is the hallmark of totalitarian regimes, one of the
indices that most distinguish them from free and democratic societies.
There is thus ample reason to weigh erroneous executions quite differently
from unavoidable deaths in the regulatory context.
We are more sympathetic to Marquis's argument about exactly who
should count as an "innocent" person, but we find the conclusion that he
draws from his revised number equally flawed. Marquis claims that if we
apply a more rigorous definition of innocence-such as "had no
involvement in the [crime], wasn't there, didn't do it" 3-the number of
wrongly convicted and sentenced to die goes down to twenty-five or thirty,
out of the 7000 murderers sentenced to death since 1976. Such a ratio,
argues Marquis, represents an episodic rather than epidemic rate of error.
1 See Ronald J. Allen & Amy Shavell, FurtherReflections on the Guillotine, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625 (2005); see also Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once
More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 967 (1985); Stephen Markman & Paul Cassell, Protecting
the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 160 n.217
(1988) (endorsing and expanding upon van den Haag's argument).
2 See Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 501
(2005).
3 Seeid. at 519.
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The problem with Marquis' argument is that, even if we completely grant
him his revised numerator, he is using the wrong denominator. It is simply
not the case that all 7000 capital convictions have been subject to the same
kind of scrutiny. The twenty-five or thirty exonerations (by Marquis's
count) largely derive from a much smaller subset of cases in which there
was significant postconviction scrutiny of the accuracy of the underlying
conviction, such as cases involving preserved and testable DNA evidence.
That such a significant fraction of these cases turned out to be erroneous
suggests by extrapolation that the number of erroneous convictions in the
entire set is much larger than Marquis allows and thus is not a number that
we should accept with regretful equanimity.
Despite our profound disagreement with these two arguments against
innocence, we have our own discomfort with the prominence of innocence
in the current debate about capital punishment. In what follows, we
articulate and develop a different set of concerns about the focus on
innocence, concerns that derive from a perspective sympathetic to reform or
abolition of the death penalty. Our discussion proceeds in three parts. In
Part I, we offer an explanation for why innocence has become so prominent
in the debate over the death penalty at this point in time (and why it played
such a minor role in the earlier debate of the 1960s and '70s). In Part II, we
question the normative distinctiveness of innocence as a problem in the
administration of capital punishment in comparison with other, more
endemic problems, such as disproportionate, arbitrary, or discriminatory
imposition of capital punishment. In Part III, we question the strategic
value of focusing on innocence in the effort to reform or abolish capital
punishment. In what follows, we seek to question and at least qualify the
apparently widespread assumption that the execution of the innocent is both
the worst problem that the administration of capital punishment faces and
the best strategic hope for reform or abolition of the death penalty in
America.
I. MOMENTS OF REFORM IN THE MODERN ERA OF THE AMERICAN DEATH

PENALTY

At the present time, the United States is fairly regarded as an outlier in
its enthusiastic embrace of the death penalty.4 Most Western countries have
abolished the death penalty altogether and few of the retentionist countries
around the world are active in carrying out executions. In light of this
present moment, it is easy to overlook the more complicated story of the

4 Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REv. 97

(2002).
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American death penalty. In its early history, the United States was at the
forefront of death penalty reform.
Almost immediately after the
Constitution was ratified, many states sought to limit the perceived excesses
of capital punishment. By the early nineteenth century, states generally
reduced the number of crimes punishable by death to a handful of crimes
whereas England recognized over 200 capital offenses. 5 The reformist
impulse was also manifest in states' efforts to limit the automatic
application of the death penalty for murder. First, many states developed a
hierarchy of murder, distinguishing between "degrees" of the crime such
that only "first degree" murder could generate a capital sentence. Later,
states gravitated toward discretionary sentencing even with respect to those
defendants convicted of murder in the first degree. By the mid-twentieth
century, virtually all American jurisdictions retaining the death penalty
afforded jurors substantial discretion to withhold the punishment based on
circumstances of the offense and offender.6
Notwithstanding these reforms, the death penalty has occupied an
important practical and symbolic role in the American criminal justice
system.
Substantial numbers of executions have been carried out
throughout our history, including a decade high of over 1500 during the
1930s. 7 The death penalty has also occupied a peculiar-and undoubtedly
significant-role in American race relations and American politics more
generally. The American death penalty has disproportionately targeted
African-American offenders (both as a matter of law in the antebellum
South and as matter of practice throughout our history8), and executions
(including extralegal executions-lynchings) have been an important
mechanism for subordinating African-Americans, particularly in the period
between Reconstruction and the modem era. Perhaps because of its
connection to race, the death penalty has received extraordinary attention in
electoral politics at both the local and national levels, despite the absence of
a significant federal death penalty. Overall, the broad history of the
American death penalty reflects a deep ambivalence about the wisdom and
role of the death penalty, and the two centuries separating early
amelioration and modem robustness saw alternating waves of reform and
retrenchment.
The modem era has seen two significant reformist moments. The first
began in the early 1960s as the number of executions drastically fell and
advocates of reform and abolition looked to the federal courts-particularly
5 STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 89-100 (2002).
6 WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 8 (1974).

7 Id. at 40.
See BANNER, supra note 5, at 141 (discussing discriminatory statutes and practices).

8
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the United States Supreme Court-to limit or abolish the death penalty. 9 In
retrospect, the 1960s look like a "perfect storm" for restricting or abolishing
the death penalty. The Civil Rights movement reached its peak in the early
1960s with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Concerns about
racial discrimination and the death penalty had pushed the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund to the forefront of anti-death penalty efforts,' 0 and the
Southern face of the death penalty-executions were increasingly
marginalized to southern and border states-naturally made capital
punishment a target for groups concerned about racial justice. Given this
context, it is not surprising that the United States Supreme Court's first
significant gesture toward the constitutional regulation of the death penalty
was the statement of three Justices that the Court should consider the
constitutionality of the death penalty for the crime of rape." All of the 455
executions for rape after 1930 in the United States occurred in southern
states, border states, and the District of Columbia, and an overwhelming
number of those executions involved African-American defendants and
white victims.12
Popular support for the death penalty also dropped to an all-time low
in the mid-1960s, 3 as the Vietnam War stirred an unprecedented skepticism
about the capacity of governmental institutions to act in a humane and
benign manner. As the general social upheaval reached its height in the late
1960s, and executions had ceased as a result of a de facto moratorium, the
death penalty seemed high on the list of orthodoxies ripe for
reconsideration.
On the legal front, the 1960s saw an explosion of decisions expanding
the federal constitutional rights of state criminal defendants. Throughout
the late 1950s and 1960s, the Warren Court recognized new procedural
protections within the Bill of Rights and extended those protections to state
trials that had previously been held only to a generalized guarantee of due
process. Among the newly extended rights-and the most substantive in

9 See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT (1973) (describing strategy of death penalty reformers during the 1960s).
10 See generally id.

11See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 889-91 (1963) (Goldberg, J., joined by
Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
12Marvin E. Wolfgang, Race Discrimination in the Death Sentence for Rape, in
BOWERS, supra note 6, at 113.

13Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades

of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARv. L. REv. 355, 410 (1995)

("[T]he 1966 Gallup poll turned out to be the only Gallup poll on the death penalty question
out of 21 such polls conducted between 1936 and 1986 in which more people opposed than
supported the death penalty for murder .. ") (citation omitted).

CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M STEIKER

[Vol. 95

nature-was the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of Cruel and Unusual
Punishments, a guarantee that had not been applied to invalidate state laws
or practices before 1962. 4
In this context, the central critiques of the death penalty focused on its
declining popular support and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution. The
infrequency of executions suggested that the law on the books might not
reflect genuine societal views. In light of the broad discretion afforded
prosecutors and jurors, there was also the fear that the few offenders
sentenced to death (or actually executed) were selected for arbitrary or
perhaps discriminatory reasons.
When the Supreme Court struck down state death penalty statutes in
Furman v. Georgia'5 in 1972, it focused precisely on these two concerns.
All five of the Justices supporting the decision expressed concerns about
arbitrariness, pointing to the absence of safeguards or procedures that would
ensure the fair selection of the condemned. In this respect, the decision
carried forward the Warren Court's faith that legal and social institutions
could be improved with additional process.
Notably, the opinions
expressed less concern about those who had been selected for death than
those who had been spared. Justice White expressed doubts about the
capacity of the death penalty to achieve the social goals of deterrence or
retribution given the paucity of executions, 16 and Justice Stewart alluded to
the numerous offenders convicted of equally reprehensible rapes and
murders who had not been death-sentenced. 17 Emphasizing the "'caste'
aspect" of the American death penalty system, 18 Justice Douglas compared
the treatment of wealthy defendants to the exemption of Brahmans under
ancient Hindu law, almost lamenting "the ability of the rich to purchase the
services of the most respected and most resourceful legal talent in the
Nation."' 9
A clear though subordinate theme of the opinions was that the
infrequency of executions cast doubt on America's genuine commitment to
the death penalty. Justice Brennan made this argument explicitly, insisting
that "[w]hen an unusually severe punishment is authorized for wide-scale
application but not, because of society's refusal, inflicted save in a few
14 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (invalidating California statute as applied
criminalizing the status of being addicted to the use of narcotics).
1"408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) ("[T]he penalty is so infrequently imposed that the
threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to criminal justice .....
17 Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
18Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).

19Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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instances, the inference is compelling that there is a deep-seated reluctance
to inflict it."20° Justice Brennan would have constitutionally abolished the

death penalty on this ground, with Justice Marshall agreeing that the death
penalty was no longer consistent with public values. Even the Justices who
held out the possibility of saving capital punishment with new procedural
safeguards were careful to defend their decision against the counterthat the "legislative will is not frustrated
majoritarian critique by observing
21
if the penalty is never imposed.",
In this reformist moment spurred by declining executions, the Court
paid virtually no attention to the risk of executing innocents as an argument
against the death penalty. Although the five Justices in the majority wrote
lengthy, wide-ranging opinions occupying almost 200 pages in the U.S.
Reports, this concern is significantly raised only by Justice Marshall and
that might turn informed
then only as the last of numerous considerations
22
public opinion against the death penalty.
States responded quickly to Furman by amending their statutes to
address the defects of unbridled discretion. 23 These newly-crafted statutes
put to rest the claim that death penalty provisions had fallen into desuetude
and reflected an outdated morality. In the decade after Furman, the Court's
regulatory efforts focused primarily on the sort of guidance required in state
schemes (through the enumeration of aggravating factors) as well as the
competing interest in preserving sentencer discretion to consider and give
effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence.24
Of course, to meet Justice White's concerns, it was not enough for
jurors to be clearly informed of the characteristics of the "worst" murders;
states had to generate significant numbers of death verdicts and executions
so that it could truly be said that the death penalty was achieving social
goals. Although the Court never explicitly insisted on increased production
in this regard, the rapid growth of death row in the three decades postFurman, as well as the willingness and ability of some death penalty states
to carry out executions, undoubtedly has solidified the death penalty's
constitutional status in the recent era.

20

Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).

2 Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring) (describing legislative delegation of discretion to

judges and jurors as sentencers such that the absence of death sentences is not contrary to
legislative policy); id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Justice White).
concurring).
22 Id. at 366-67 (Marshall, J.,
23 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13, at 410.
24

Id. at 371-403.
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When Furman addressed the constitutionality of capital punishment in
1972, the national death row numbered in the 600S,25 and states conducted
twenty-one executions during the period 1965-1983.26 Thirty years after
Furman, the national death row had climbed over 3500, with California's
death row (613) about as large as the nation's death row at the time Furman
was decided. 27 Executions reached a post-Furman yearly peak in 1999
(ninety-eight) 28 and there have been 933 executions nationwide over the
past two decades (1984-2004).29
We are now in the midst of the second reformist moment in the
modern era in which the death penalty itself seems ripe for significant
reform, if not wholesale reconsideration. The driving concern is the risk of
death-sentencing and executing innocents. This issue emerged as lawyers
and journalists brought to light numerous instances of innocents
erroneously sentenced to death.30 In Illinois, one inmate, Anthony Porter,
had come perilously close to execution before journalism students
discovered the actual perpetrator of his crime. 31 The circumstances of his
case and the investigation made clear that it was entirely a matter of fortuity
that Porter had not been executed before his innocence was established.
Ultimately, the Chicago Tribune detailed systemic problems in the Illinois
32
criminal justice system traceable in part to prosecutorial misconduct.
Following the publicity in Porter's case, the discovery of other innocents on
Illinois's death row, and the journalistic account of rampant prosecutorial
misconduct, Republican Governor George Ryan declared a moratorium on
executions.
At the same time, new developments in DNA technology made it
possible to reevaluate evidence in dormant cases-particularly sex
offenses-leading to the exoneration of both capital and non-capital
25 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.
php?scid=15&did=410#SuspendingtheDeathPenalty (last visited Jan. 30, 2005).
26 Id. at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146 (indicating eleven
executions between 1976-1985 inclusive); Bowers, supra note 6, at 23 (indicating ten
executions for the period 1965-1967); Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=l 5&did=410#SuspendingtheDeathPenalty
(describing ten year moratorium between 1967-1977).
27 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
article.php?scid 9&did= 188#year.
28 Id. at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146.
Id.
30 Ronald Tabak, Finality Without Fairness:Why We are Moving Towards Moratoriaon
29

Executions, and the PotentialAbolition of CapitalPunishment, 33 CONN. L. REv. 733, 73941(2001).
31 Id. at 739.
32 Id. at 740.
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prisoners. The 2000 publication of Actual Innocence,33 which recounted the
efforts of Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, pioneers in the post-conviction
use of DNA to uncover erroneous convictions, contributed to the mounting
perception that our criminal justice system was fallible even in, and perhaps
especially in, capital cases. Over the past five years, public and political
attention to the American system of capital punishment has equaled and
perhaps surpassed the scrutiny of the Furman era.
At first glance the emergent heightened concerns about the death
penalty seem perfectly understandable in light of the discovery of wrongly
convicted and in some cases death-sentenced inmates. On the other hand, it
seems odd that this issue should have so much more traction today than in
the past. The fear of executing innocents has surfaced numerous times in
American history, and the argument about the fallibility of human judgment
has always been present in the larger moral debate about the death penalty.
Indeed, in the early 1990s, there was little public attention or outrage when
the Supreme Court was faced with the provocative question whether the
Constitution prohibited the execution of the actually innocent.34 The "real"
question of the case was a procedural one: whether states were required to
afford death-sentenced inmates a vehicle for litigating newly-discovered
evidence of innocence.35 Perhaps because the inmate raising the question
had not convincingly established his innocence, the case was greeted as a
non-event. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in announcing the judgment of
the Court, was almost cavalier in rejecting the notion that courts-as
opposed to executive officials exercising their clemency powers-had any
obligation to correct convictions "merely" because the wrong person had
been condemned in the absence of some separate constitutional violation.36
It is hard to imagine the same sort of opinion being written today, and
the question we address in this paper is whether the changed climate reflects
a new wisdom about the significance of the possibility of error in the death
penalty debate. From a normative perspective, is the problem of wrongful
convictions powerfully different from other sorts of challenges to the death
penalty? In the second half of our piece, we address the practical and
strategic issues-whether the focus on innocence is a prudent path toward
reform or abolition of the death penalty, and whether such a focus
33 Jim

DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER

DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000).
34 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
35 See id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (describing issue as "whether a fairly

convicted and therefore legally guilty person is constitutionally entitled to yet another
judicial proceeding in which to adjudicate his guilt anew").
36 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 408-15 (detailing arguments against recognizing constitutional
right to post-conviction forum in this context).
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undermines or reinforces reform in the criminal justice system more
generally. Here, though, we'd like to examine and question what appears to
be a central premise of the "innocence movement"--that the possibility of
executing innocents is of greater normative concern than other kinds of
error in capital punishment and thus offers a comparatively stronger basis
for abolition or reform of the death penalty.
II. THE APPEAL OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE
We all recoil at the prospect of executing "actual innocents." This
reflexive revulsion is obviously justified, but it is nonetheless important and
valuable to specify the nature and degree of harm associated with punishing
innocents. After all, virtually every socially valuable endeavor carries with
it the risk of harm, and it is fair to ask whether the risks (or ultimate harms)
in the end are justified. Virtually all would agree that it is better that one
guilty person go free (or be spared execution) to prevent the incarceration or
execution of an innocent; but at some point the numbers matter.37 The
distinctive claim of the newly emerging "innocence movement" is that the
harms associated with executing innocents are of such a different kind or
degree that we should not risk these sorts of errors even as we must tolerate
others.
There are six prominent arguments for the special wrongness of
executing the innocent. First, such punishment generates an enormous
retributive gap between the individual's culpability (none) and the
punishment received (death). Second, the false conviction of an innocent
leaves unpunished the true offender, creating an additional retributive gap
and perhaps risking the safety of others if the real culprit remains free to reoffend. Third, the failure to punish the true offender, if known to the
community, undermines general deterrence. Fourth, the punishment of the
innocent coupled with the failure to punish the guilty causes a loss to the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system-a loss that could have
consequences not only for society's effort to prevent crime and achieve
justice, but also for the capacity of government to be successful in other
areas of social policy. Fifth, the punishment of innocents involves a special
sort of cruelty because the innocent offender, as he awaits and receives his
punishment, knows that the punishment is undeserved. Lastly, executing
(as opposed to incarcerating) innocents includes the additional harm of
irrevocability.
37 For a whimsical treatment of the appropriate denominator, see Alexander Volokh, n

Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173 (1997) (detailing varying formulations of the
Blackstonian declaration, "'Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent
suffer') (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352).
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Each of these harms is undoubtedly significant and in some sense
vindicates the intuitive horror of punishing (and especially executing) the
innocent.
We believe, though, that the case for the normative
distinctiveness of this danger might be overstated. Other sorts of error in
the criminal justice system, including arbitrary and unequal treatment of
offenders as well as disproportionate punishment of the "guilty," generate
similar harms. Moreover, even if the punishment or execution of the
innocent can be said to cause harms of a different degree if not kind, we
believe that the comparative prevalence of other injustices suggests that the
risk of executing innocents might deserve less attention than other
normative claims against the death penalty; in short, such errors might well
be worse when they happen but collectively they are not necessarily the
worst part of our capital punishment system. Lastly, we worry that the real
attraction of the innocence critique of the death penalty (the fear of
executing innocents) might be attributable less to a defensible normative
position than to a familiar but nonetheless lamentable psychological
dynamic: the harm of punishing innocents resonates with the public
precisely because most Americans can empathize with the harms that they
fear could happen to themselves, rather than those that happen only to "bad
people." Lurking behind innocence's appeal, then, might be indifference if
not hostility to other types of injustice.
We discuss the plausible candidates for the distinctive harm of
executing innocents in turn.
A. RETRIBUTIVE GAP
The execution of the innocent obviously violates a basic principle of
retributivism. Although retribution is often invoked as a justification for
punishment, 38 it can also fairly be invoked as a limitation on punishment,
requiring that punishment should correspond to (and not exceed) a
defendant's blameworthiness. The problem of "excessive punishment" is
ubiquitous in the contemporary American death penalty practice, and yet
few of these cases involve the actually innocent.
It is important to clarify here that in contemporary discourse
surrounding the risk of executing innocent persons, "innocent" typically
refers to the completely blameless, as in the case of a defendant
misidentified as the perpetrator who had no involvement whatsoever in the
offense for which he was convicted and sentenced. Indeed, when defense
lawyers, abolitionists, politicians, and the media refer to the "innocents"
38 MICHAEL

MooRE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 233 (1984) ("Retributivism... is the view

that punishment is justified by the desert of the offender ....

).
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freed from death row, they often describe them as "the exonerated"individuals wholly absolved of blame. Of course, those seeking significant
reform or abolition of the death penalty on these grounds have an interest in
upping the numbers to generate interest in the problem, and many accounts
or lists of "the exonerated" include defendants who were not wholly
blameless.3 9 It is clear, though, that the sort of innocence that has captured
popular and political attention is "pure" innocence, with DNA exonerations
serving as the paradigm of "erroneous" convictions. The number of deathrow inmates exonerated in the modem era who fit this definition is subject
to dispute, but by any account this number appears to be larger than most
casual observers of the criminal justice system would have expected. And
this distance between expectation and reality seems directly responsible for
the renewed interest in our system of capital punishment over the past halfdecade.
But the problem of "retributive gap" is not limited to the wholly
blameless. Capital trials are notoriously messy affairs, 40 and there are
numerous categories of death-sentenced (and executed) defendants whose
death sentences can fairly be characterized as "excessive" punishment. In
cases involving multiple defendants, prosecutors-and jurors-often
misidentify the most culpable offender.
In many instances, the
identification of the "triggerperson" is actually irrelevant to death-eligibility
as a matter of state and federal law, because the Constitution does not
forbid death sentences based on accomplice liability so long as the
defendant was a significant participant in a dangerous felony.4
Nonetheless, the fact that the death penalty is authorized in certain cases
does not necessarily mean it is deserved, and prosecutors and jurors would

39 John McAdams, It's Good and We're Going to Keep It: A Response to Ronald Tabak,

33 CoNN.L. REv. 819, 827 (2001) (claiming that "death penalty opponents have radically
and systematically exaggerated the number" of death row inmates who have been
"exonerated").
40 Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia insisted that the death
penalty distorts the fair and orderly process of the criminal law. See 408 U.S. 238, 238
(1972):
The deleterious effects of the death penalty are also felt otherwise at trial. For example, its very
existence "inevitably sabotages a social or institutional program of reformation." In short "the
presence of the death penalty as the keystone of our penal system bedevils the administration of
criminal justice all the way down the line and is the stumbling block in the path of general
reform and of the treatment of crime and criminals."
Id. (citations omitted).
41 Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (death penalty is constitutionally
proportionate as applied to major participants in dangerous felonies who exhibit reckless
indifference to human life).
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in many cases have exercised their discretion differently if the "true" facts
of the crime had been known to them.
Other defendants have been convicted and sentenced to death contrary
to emerging recognition that such punishment is excessive. Dozens of
defendants with mental retardation were executed in the decades before the
Supreme Court declared the practice "excessive" and contrary to evolving
standards of decency,4 2 and numerous juveniles were also executed 43 though
the Court, following public trends, recently recognized this practice to be
"excessive" as well.44
In many capital trials, inadequate representation causes jurors to
sentence defendants to death whose mitigation, if properly investigated and
presented, would have secured a different outcome. In such circumstances,
the failure to account for the defendant's reduced moral culpability in light
of his mitigating evidence renders his punishment excessive. This problem
is commonplace, as capital trial lawyers (and appellate courts reviewing
capital convictions) have only recently and still imperfectly come to
recognize the awesome investigative responsibility entailed in death penalty
defense.45 In addition, many capital defendants whose attorneys did
develop significant mitigation at trial were condemned under sentencing
schemes that precluded jurors from considering and giving effect to such
evidence.46 Texas, the modem leader in executions,47 did not change its
quasi-mandatory statute until the early 1990s, 48 and many of the 300 or so

inmates executed in Texas during the modem era were condemned by
jurors who were never asked whether the death penalty was deserved. The
Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, supra note 25, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php (noting thirty-four executed offenders with evidence of mental retardation).
43 Id. at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions.php (documenting twenty-two
42

executed offenders who were juveniles at the time of their crimes).
44 Roper v. Simmons, No. 03-633, 2005 WL 464890 (U.S. Mar.
1, 2005).
45 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (concluding that trial counsel's
failure to investigate and develop significant mitigating evidence of abuse constituted
deficient performance and that there was a reasonability probability that such evidence
would have affected the outcome at sentencing).
46 See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989) (Penry 1) (holding that Texas
special scheme, which asked jurors only whether the defendant's conduct was deliberate and
whether the defendant would be dangerous in the future, was constitutionally inadequate
where the defendant's mitigating evidence of mental retardation and abuse had relevance
outside of those inquiries).
47 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. website, supra note 25, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
executions.php (noting that Texas has carried out 339 out of the 945 executions in the
modem era).
48 See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 13, at 393-96 (describing litigation surrounding old
Texas statute based on inability of jurors to give effect to mitigating evidence).
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Supreme Court's recent highly-publicized efforts 49 to extend relief to Texas
defendants sentenced under such circumstances should not obscure the fact
that many more defendants from that period were executed and might well
not have deserved to die.
Thus, the problem of "retributive gap" is not unique to "pure"
innocents but an endemic problem in the American death penalty. And it is
striking that comparatively little attention is paid to those defendants who,
though guilty of a crime (perhaps manslaughter, or non-capital murder, or
capital murder accompanied by powerful mitigation), are punished
excessively.
B. FAILURE TO PUNISH AND INCAPACITATE THE "TRUE" OFFENDER
Apart from the obvious costs to the wrongly punished,
misidentification of the perpetrators of crime prevents or delays the truly
guilty from receiving deserved punishment and fails to incapacitate
dangerous offenders.
Indeed, after Anthony Porter's innocence was
established in Illinois, police came to suspect that the true culprit committed
another murder during the interval between Porter's arrest and
exoneration. 50 The failure to identify, apprehend, and punish the guilty is of
course a serious problem in the criminal law generally. "Underinclusion"
seems to be of special concern in the death penalty context, and, as noted
above,5 1 several of the opinions in Furman regarded the failure to punish
deserving (or at least equally deserving) offenders with the death penalty as
constitutionally problematic.
The difficulty with this argument is that the erroneous punishment of
the actually innocent accounts for an extremely small part of the
underinclusion problem. Many offenders are not apprehended or punished
simply because their crimes go unsolved, not because an innocent person
has been wrongly charged or convicted. More significantly, the very
protections our system adopts to prevent the conviction and punishment of
49 See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001) (Penry I1) (rejecting "nullification"
question as adequate vehicle for mitigating evidence unrelated to the dangerousness and
deliberateness questions answered by the jury); Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562 (2004)
(rejecting Fifth Circuit's policy of applying Penry I only to cases involving mitigating
evidence amounting to a uniquely severe condition with a nexus to the crime); Smith v.
Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400 (2004) (summarily reversing Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's
decision which had purported to distinguish the nullification charge from the one given in
Penry II and which had found the defendant's mitigating evidence addressable via the
special issues under Penry 1).
50 James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What's DNA Got To Do With It?,
33 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 527, 539 (2002).
51See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
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the innocent obviously also protect the guilty. Our demand of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt guarantees that some, perhaps many, guilty offenders
will escape punishment. The problem of "false negatives"-offenders
escaping punishment-is less the result of "false positives" than of our
efforts to avoid "false positives." In short, we could hardly improve, much
less solve, the problem of underinclusion by increasing safeguards against
erroneous convictions.
Moreover, to the extent pervasive underinclusion has been uncovered
in the death penalty context, it regrettably has been linked to racial
discrimination. It is familiar history that African-American defendants
were uncommonly likely to be punished with death from the founding until
the modem era, and much of modem constitutional criminal procedure is
traceable to concerns about sham trials-such as in the Scottsboro casesresulting in African-Americans being sentenced to death. In the present
era, though, race appears to surface less as an aggravating factor in cases
involving minority defendants than as a mitigating factor in cases involving
minority victims. Indeed, the famous Baldus study litigated in McCleskey
v. Kemp 53 strikingly revealed that killers of blacks (who themselves tend to
be black) were more than four times less likely to receive the death penalty
than killers of whites.5 4 This fact, of course, made McCleskey a difficult
case, because it is not obvious that this sort of race-of-the-victim
discrimination should be addressed by sparing killers of whites rather than
ensuring vindication of minority victims.55

In any case, the harm of

underinclusion is not particular to the problem of punishing innocents, and
contemporary empirical evidence such as the Baldus study suggests that
systemic underinclusion is attributable to other, more troublesome, causes.
C. UNDERMINING DETERRENCE
The argument here is quite similar. The failure to punish true
offenders undermines general deterrence because the true offender escapes
punishment (and society presumably eventually learns of that fact). Again,
this harm is certainly real, but the harm is not particular to inaccurate
convictions, and inaccurate convictions are not a particularly significant
See Michael Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern CriminalProcedure, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 48 (2000) (discussing role of Scottsboro cases and others in the development of
modem constitutional criminal procedure).
5' 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
54 Id. at 287 (noting that under Baldus study, "even after taking account of thirty-nine
nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to
receive a death sentence as defendants charged with killing blacks").
52

55 See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 340-45 (1997) (discussing

problems of remedy).
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source of the problem of sub-optimal deterrence. Ironically, inaccurate
convictions might actually serve deterrence purposes if their error goes
undetected. Clearly one of the central dynamics leading to inaccurate
convictions is the pressure law enforcement officials feel to clear cases.
This pressure stems in part from society's desire to communicate clearly the
"crime-does-not-pay" message. It is actually a contested empirical matter
whether the erroneous convictions secured under such circumstances
contribute to or detract from deterrence. We would have to know (as we do
not) what percentage of inaccurate convictions are discovered; we would
also need more information regarding how communities (particularly
would-be criminals) receive the respective "messages" of, first, the quick
apprehension of the "perpetrator" and, second, the belated discovery that
the true perpetrator went unpunished. Indeed, one of the challenges to
purely utilitarian theories of punishment is the possibility that society could
achieve a net benefit by punishing innocents to deter crime if the innocence
of those punished could remain undetected (or at least undiscovered for an
extended time).5 6
D. LOST LEGITIMACY
The execution of innocent offenders undoubtedly would exact a steep
price in terms of governmental legitimacy. It is a matter of common
understanding that greater resources are devoted to capital cases, and a
substantial error rate in such cases would certainly prompt serious doubts
about the accuracy of the criminal justice system more generally. A crisis
of confidence might extend beyond the criminal justice system as well. It is
a familiar critique of the death penalty that if we cannot trust our
government on small matters and regularly find fault in the ordinary
operation of governmental bureaucracies, we should not entrust the state
with the enormity of the death penalty. But in fact, the better argument
might run the other way: if the government cannot get it right when a
person's life is at stake, when everyone appreciates the stakes and
substantial resources are mobilized to prevent error, how can we have
confidence in the state's decision-making in less scrutinized areas?
It is a slightly different and more difficult question whether the
discovery of erroneously death-sentenced individuals undermines
governmental legitimacy. Supporters of the death penalty have pointed to
the same evidence trumpeted by reformers and abolitionists-the discovery
56

See MOORE, supra note 38, at 238 (describing case in which significant social benefits

could be achieved by punishing an innocent person and concluding that "there is no a priori
reason that the net social gain in such a case might not outweigh the harm that is achieved by
punishing an innocent person").
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of numerous death-sentenced innocents during the appellate and postconviction process-as proof of the system's corrective potential."
Developments over the past five years seem to have generated serious
concern about the accuracy of the American death penalty system. It
remains difficult, though, to assess how the public would react today to the
execution of an innocent given the absence of an undisputed, unequivocal
case involving the execution of a blameless person in the modem era.
It is also fair to ask whether the loss of legitimacy caused by the
execution of the innocent might be offset by the legitimacy gains realized
by the execution of the guilty. Austin Sarat, reflecting on the continued
presence of the death penalty in a country that regards itself as "the most
democratic of democratic nations' 58 suggests that the death penalty might
serve an important role in confirming the strength and authority of our
leaders. 59 Democracies, he argues, in which the locus of power is in the
"people," need dramatic symbols to confirm their precarious sovereignty,
and "[i]f the sovereignty of the people is to be genuine, it has to mimic the
sovereign power and prerogatives of the monarchical forms it displaced and
about whose sovereignty there could be few doubts., 60
The recent
experiences in American presidential elections support this notion, as both
President George W. Bush and particularly President Bill Clinton sought to
establish their leadership credentials by demonstrating their (regal)
willingness to preside over executions.61
In evaluating the potential harm of lost legitimacy, we should
recognize that other aspects of our death penalty system undermine
legitimacy as well. Arbitrary or discriminatory use of the death penalty can
affect public confidence even if the public harbors no doubts about the guilt
of each executed defendant. As our introduction suggests, "legitimacy"
depends critically on context, and in times of declining executions, the
public might be more alarmed by the inequitable or arbitrary distribution of
the death penalty than by the more remote risk of executing innocents.
Conversely, as executions rise, and less popular (and perhaps less executive
and judicial) attention is paid to the circumstances of each case,

57 McAdams, supra note 39, at 834 ("[N]o proof of an innocent executed in the U.S. in

the last generation... suggests that the system works .....
58 AUSTIN SARAT, THE KILLING STATE 5 (1999).
60

id.
id.

61

Richard Brooks & Steven Raphael, Criminal Law: Life Terms of Death Sentences: The

59

Uneasy Relationship Between JudicialElections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 609, 639 (2002) (discussing political costs of opposing capital punishment).
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"legitimacy" might require assurance that innocents are not regularly being
caught in the machinery of death.
E. SPECIAL CRUELTY OF ENDURING UNDESERVED PUNISHMENT
The horror of executing innocents might ultimately turn on our
revulsion at the prospect of someone being forced to walk to his death
knowing his punishment to be undeserved. This harm strikes a more
visceral chord than harms associated with underinclusion (knowing that one
deserves death but that some equally deserving offender has been spared) or
procedural irregularity (the evidence of one's guilt was obtained through
questionable means). The harm is likely compounded by the stigma heaped
upon both the condemned and his family. In children we see a disbelieving
and painful anger when punishment is undeserved, and our intuitions
recognize as more painful the wrongful and inescapable infliction of pain.
Here, too, we acknowledge the horror and harm but doubt its
distinctiveness. As an initial matter, this argument about the distinctive
cruelty surrounding the punishment of innocents raises profound questions.
Many offenders, though in fact guilty, manage to persuade themselves of
their own innocence. Is their punishment less cruel because their "honest"
belief in victimization is objectively unreasonable? In terms of magnitude,
the group of self-assessed martyrs is likely to greatly outnumber the truly
innocent.
A separate claim relating to cruelty at the moment of execution based
on psychological factors concerns the execution of the incompetent.
Although the Supreme Court has concluded that the Constitution forbids the
execution of persons incompetent at the time of execution,62 few protections
in American death penalty law have been enforced less vigorously. The
Supreme Court has not crafted a general standard for assessing competency,
and many jurisdictions apply an extremely thin version of what it means to
be "sane" at the time of execution. As a result, state and lower federal
courts routinely sustain competency findings in the face of substantial
evidence of impaired or even delusional thought on the part of the
defendant.
In an infamous Arkansas case during Bill Clinton's first
presidential campaign, the inmate's execution was allowed to go forward
despite the inmate's apparent belief that he could eat his dessert after the
execution. 63 And in a case involving a Texas inmate, the federal courts
authorized the execution of an inmate notwithstanding the inmate's
62

Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).

63 See, e.g., Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as CulturalDocument: Seeking the
Morally Optimal Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 283 (1996) (exploring the political

dimensions underlying the denial of clemency in Ricky Rector's case).
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delusional belief that his "dead aunt [would] protect him from the effects of
the sedative and toxic agents used., 64 In cases of acknowledged psychosis,
some states have sought to forcibly medicate inmates with approaching
execution dates to render them competent for execution, and the federal
constitutional status of such a practice remains open to debate.
If the paradigm, then, of a "non-cruel" execution is one in which the
condemned acknowledges or at least understands his responsibility for his
crime and rationally connects his impending punishment to his own
culpable actions, executions are cruelly administered on a regular basis in
the United States. The harm associated with the execution of innocents
cannot fairly be characterized as distinctive in this regard.65
F. IRREVOCABILITY
Thus far we have argued that many of the harms associated with
punishing the innocent can be found in cases involving those guilty of
wrongdoing. A more tailored claim might assert the distinctiveness of
executing as opposed to incarcerating inmates. On this view, we should be
especially concerned about punishing innocents in the capital context
because death is irrevocable: it is a common and thoroughly respectable
concern about the death penalty that executions cannot be undone. This
harm, like some of those discussed above, has both an individual and
societal dimension: wrongful executions are terrible for the innocent
condemned because their lives are unrecoverable and terrible for society
because such errors are beyond repair. But we doubt that the death penalty
is truly distinctive in this respect. Innocents who are convicted and
incarcerated can be freed from prison, but their time spent in prison is
likewise unrecoverable. In this respect, the argument of irrevocability is
truly an argument about severity; it is impossible to turn back the clock on
any punishment that has been endured, and the irretrievable loss in the
death penalty context exceeds the loss of wrongful imprisonment.
Moreover, errors are less likely to be uncovered and corrected in the
non-capital context. As a procedural matter, non-capital inmates have
fewer avenues and resources for vindicating their claims of innocence.
64 Garrett v. Collins, 951 F.2d 57, 58 (5th Cir. 1992).
65 Some might argue that wrongful execution (as opposed to incarceration) of the
innocent is especially cruel, but we have our doubts. Undeserved punishment carries this
cost in both capital and non-capital cases. Wrongful incarceration is endured one day at a

time, and the structural deafness of our criminal justice system to non-capital claims of
actual innocence undoubtedly compounds the frustration of involuntary restraint. Again, the
collective magnitude of the error in the non-capital context dwarfs the corresponding harm in
our administration of the death penalty.
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States generally provide post-conviction counsel as a matter of right to
indigent death-sentenced inmates, but not to others, and Congress likewise
funds indigent representation in federal habeas only in capital cases. Media
attention is also likely to be directed toward capital cases, in part because of
society's fascination with death and in part because of the presence of an
advocate for the inmate. The recent burgeoning of "innocence projects"
will help vindicate some claims of non-capital inmates, particularly in cases
involving DNA, but the resources presently available to non-capital inmates
are plainly insufficient to assure meaningful investigation in the vast
majority of cases. Given a national prison population hovering over
2,000,000, even an optimistic error rate of one percent would translate into
more than 20,000 wrongfully incarcerated inmates. The irreparable loss for
those individuals represents an undoubtedly significant harm, and in
practical terms amounts to many more ruined lives than could be attributed
to the American death penalty over its whole history much less in the
modem era.

We thus conclude that the conviction and execution of the innocent
entails harms that are ubiquitously present in the capital punishment system.
Perhaps more significantly, other sorts of injustices, including the arbitrary
or discriminatory administration of the death penalty and the execution of
guilty but undeserving or impaired offenders, actually present these risks in
greater magnitudes.
What, then, accounts for the apparent appeal of the innocence
argument and the comparative devaluation of other errors and injustices in
our criminal justice system? We fear that the power of innocence claims
derives in large part from a type of cognitive bias. Individuals tend to
overestimate risks of harm that they believe themselves to face and to
underestimate risks they view as attaching only to others. Even with our
extraordinary incarceration rates, most Americans do not view themselves
as potential criminals, and thus most Americans are unlikely to view
themselves as subject to the many risks of harm we detailed above. On the
other hand, we suspect that many Americans, whether offender or nonoffender, can imagine getting erroneously caught in the web of the criminal
justice system, even if, as a practical matter, the overall risk is small and
overwhelmingly distributed to actual offenders (the usual suspects). This
process of identification is fueled by dramatic media accounts of the
wrongfully accused and convicted and the comparative lack of public
interest in the harms inflicted upon the guilty. Hence, though we obviously
acknowledge the devastating costs of punishing and executing the innocent,
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we are not persuaded, as a normative matter, that such costs necessarily
deserve priority in critiquing the American capital justice system.
III. INNOCENCE AS STRATEGY

Those who work as litigators to free the innocent from death row, or
those who work as reformers to prevent or reduce the incidence of such
miscarriages of justice, are by no means necessarily insensitive to the less
dramatic, but more endemic, injustices in the administration of capital
punishment that we have described above. Rather, it is commonly, indeed
virtually universally, believed that emphasis on the possible execution of
the innocent is the best strategy to broadly reform or even to abolish the
death penalty. Hence, death penalty reformers and abolitionists might
respond to our arguments questioning the distinctiveness of innocence as a
normative matter by asserting the power of innocence as a reforming or
abolitionist strategy.
Who cares, they might say or think, whether
innocence is special in some abstract sense, when it is so clearly special in
the concrete political sense as a lever by which to move public opinion and
public policy?
The argument for the strategic distinctiveness of innocence is as
powerful, perhaps even more so, than the argument for its normative
distinctiveness. Some of those closest to the action have begun to use the
term "innocence revolution" to describe the past five years of renewed
skepticism, debate, and public policy initiatives at all levels of government
regarding the administration of the death penalty.66 Rob Warden's paper in
this symposium is a riveting account of the most dramatic chapter thus far
in the story of the "innocence revolution"-the experience of the state of
Illinois, in which a spate of high-profile exonerations of death row inmates
galvanized a Republican governor to declare a moratorium on executions
and then to offer mass clemency to the entire death row population.6 7
Warden also describes the somewhat less dramatic movement of the
reluctant Illinois legislature toward a reform "package" that attempts to
respond to some of the most egregious problems in the administration of
capital punishment that were brought to light by the post-exoneration
investigations into the failure of the Illinois criminal justice system.68 The
66 Mark A. Godsey & Thomas Pulley, The Innocence Revolution and Our "Evolving
Standards of Decency" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence,29 U. DAYTON L. REv. 265 (2004);
Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 573 (2004).
67 Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How it Happened, What it Promises, 95
J. CRiM. L. & CRIMI'NOLOGY 381 (2005).
68 Id. at 387-88.
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Illinois experience, while unusually dramatic, illustrates well the attraction
of focusing on innocence as a strategy for both abolitionists and reformers.
From the abolitionist perspective, Governor Ryan's complete conversion
from supporter of capital punishment to abolitionist holds out the hope that
mounting concerns about executing the innocent may shake the solid
foundation of public support for capital punishment that has existed since
the 1970s. 69 From the reformist perspective, the work of the Illinois
legislature suggests that concerns about innocence can lead to widespread
systemic reform-not only greater DNA collection and testing, but also
reforms designed to improve police investigative procedures, to prevent
prosecutorial misconduct, and to provide better funding and higher
standards for capital defense, among other things. The power of the
"innocence movement" to promote reform derives in large part from the
fact that DNA exonerations offer what Richard Rosen has called a "random
audit" of convictions, thus providing a window into the mistakes of the
criminal justice system and generating a list of particular failures that need
to be corrected. 70 Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld, the leaders of the DNA
exoneration movement and co-founders of The Innocence Project at the
Cardozo School of Law, have repeatedly urged that the false convictions
they have uncovered require not only more "innocence projects" and DNA
reforms, but also broader systemic reforms of the criminal justice system.7'
Thus, it is not surprising that abolitionists and reformers alike,
appalled and galvanized by the discovery of innocent convicts on death
row, have treated the problem of innocence as something of a strategic gift.
History may prove them right; it may turn out that current concerns about
executing the innocent will provide a crucial push toward ultimate abolition
of the death penalty in the United States, or that important reforms in
capital punishment or criminal justice generally will be instituted in
response to those concerns. There are reasons, however, to look the
proverbial gift horse in the mouth. One of the privileges and duties of the
legal academy is to question conventional orthodoxies, and we seek here to
question and perhaps to qualify the current consensus that focus on the
problem of innocence is the best strategy for promoting change regarding
the administration of capital punishment. What follows are three sets of
69 Gallup polling data, asking the same abstract question, "Do you favor the death
penalty for those convicted of murder?," has reported substantial majorities in favor of the
death penalty from the early 1970s on, though the numbers have dropped from high of 80%
in favor in 1994 to a recent low of 66% in the October, 2004 poll. See Press Release, Joseph
Carroll, Assistant Editor, The Gallup Organization, Who Supports the Death Penalty? (Nov.
16, 2004), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid = 23&did=1266.
70 Richard A. Rosen, Innocence andDeath, 82 N.C. L. REv. 61, 69 (2003).
71 See generally DWYER ET AL., supra note 33.
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concerns about the current unquestioning focus on innocence. Even if these
concerns are not sufficient to offset the benefits of focusing on innocenceand, frankly, we are not certain that they are-they at least illuminate some
possible pitfalls that may lie along this strategic path.
A. THE OTHER INNOCENCE REVOLUTION: TRUTH-SEEKING AS A
LIMIT ON LITIGATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
It should be with some sense of irony that advocates hail the
"innocence revolution" in the debate about capital punishment, because not
very long ago there was an "innocence revolution" of a different sort in
criminal procedure that has had a huge impact on the litigation of
constitutional claims by capital defendants. In response to the Warren
Court's incorporation of the criminal procedure provisions of the Bill of
Rights, its expansive reading of those provisions, and its liberal approach
toward the availability of federal review of state court convictions, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts moved in the 1970s and 1980s to craft rules of
constitutional adjudication in the criminal process to focus on truth-seeking
rather than vindication of constitutional rights per se. This reorientation
had a substantial impact on the constitutional standards regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial duties to disclose
exculpatory evidence-the two constitutional issues most important to
capital defendants. At the same time, the Court substantially narrowed the
availability of federal habeas corpus review, crafting exceptions for claims
of "actual innocence." Congress then adopted and strengthened these
limitations on habeas review, codifying some of the "innocence"
exceptions, while at the same time narrowing them. Many of those who
now hail the new "innocence revolution" and its potential to reform or
abolish capital punishment railed against these earlier judicial and
legislative innovations. We fear that unreflective embrace of "innocence"
as strategy by reformers and abolitionists may undermine the efforts and
credibility of the criminal and capital defense bar in its attempt to formulate
and litigate alternatives to this earlier "innocence revolution."
Consider first the striking reorientation of federal habeas review
around the issue of actual innocence. Judge Henry Friendly's hugely
influential 1970 speech and article, Is Innocence Irrelevant?,72 repudiated
the Warren Court's expansive treatment of collateral federal review of state
court convictions as a vehicle for the consideration of all federal
constitutional claims in a federal forum. Rather, argued Friendly, federal

72

Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? CollateralAttack on Criminal Judgments,

38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 142 (1970).
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habeas review of constitutional issues should be restricted, with rare
exception, to the much smaller subset of such issues that are accompanied
by a colorable claim of actual innocence. Friendly's exhortation fell on
receptive ears on the Court, and the resulting judicial reorientation of
federal habeas law is well-known-and frequently lamented by critics of
capital punishment. While the Court did not directly embrace potential
innocence as a precondition for federal habeas relief, it instead repeatedly
tightened procedural requirements for federal habeas petitions, 73 allowing
only few and narrow exceptions for the many petitioners who failed to meet
them-with innocence paramount among the exceptions. 74 Moreover, the
Court also limited the substantive scope of federal habeas review in two
different ways, both of which reflected its emphasis on innocence as a
limiting criterion. First, the Court's preclusion of Fourth Amendment
claims from re-litigation in a federal forum was based on Justice Powell's
recognition, citing Friendly, that such claims always impede rather than
promote the accuracy of criminal verdicts.75 Second, the Court's preclusion
of "new" constitutional claims on federal habeas, like its tightened
procedural rules, allowed only narrow exceptions, the most significant of
which concerned issues related to verdict accuracy.76 Finally, for the
increasingly few habeas claims that both meet the Court's heightened
procedural requirements and fall within its narrowed scope of review, the
Court has relaxed the standard for deeming constitutional errors harmless
on habeas review, once again on grounds that only truly grievous
constitutional wrongs-conviction of the innocent being the paramount
case-should be corrected on habeas.7 7
73 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (excuse for petitioner's failure to
comply with state procedural rule must meet "cause and prejudice" standard rather than
"deliberate bypass" standard of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)); Keeney v. TamayoReyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (applying "cause and prejudice" standard to failure to develop the
facts underlying claim) (overruling Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)); McCleskey v.
Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (applying "cause and prejudice" standard to new claims not
presented in previous petition); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (applying "cause
and prejudice" standard to successive claims raising grounds identical to grounds heard and
decided on the merits in a previous petition).
74 The Court crafted a narrow "miscarriage of justice" exception to the "cause and
prejudice" requirement, allowing petitioners to raise successive claims, repetitive new
claims, or defaulted claims if they made a colorable showing of actual innocence of the
underlying crime. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (repetitive new claims);
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (defaulted claims); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436 (1986) (successive claims); see also Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (crafting
an even narrower "innocent of the death penalty" miscarriage-of-justice exception).
75 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
76 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
77 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
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This judicial "innocence revolution" had already been fully
accomplished when Congress joined the fray, amending the federal habeas
statute in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).78 Congress, like the Court, did not make innocence a threshold
requirement for habeas review. Moreover, Congress made many restrictive
changes to habeas law either unrelated to or at odds with innocence as a
central foCUS. 79 Nonetheless, in several key ways, the 1996 amendments
borrowed from and exaggerated the Court's use of innocence as a gateway
to habeas relief. In banning consideration of new claims raised in a second
or successive habeas petition, Congress, like the Court, crafted an
"innocence" exception 8 -but limited it to claims of factual innocence of
the underlying offense (rather than ineligibility for the death penalty, as the
Court permitted), 81 and required that the petitioner prove such factual
innocence by "clear and convincing evidence '82 (rather than the Court's
less demanding "more likely than not ' 83 standard).84
Similarly, in
restricting the availability of evidentiary hearings on habeas review,
Congress crafted an "innocence" exception that resembled the one adopted
by the Court,85 but with the same exaggerations found in its successive
petition provisions.86

78

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections

of 28 U.S.C.).
79 For example, AEDPA's "opt-in" provisions, providing a shorter statute of limitations
in capital cases for states who meet certain standards for provision of capital representation
services, have no direct relationship to innocence; arguably, AEDPA's creation of a statute
of limitations with no explicit innocence exception is at odds with concerns about innocence
preservation.
80 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2000).
81 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
82 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
83 See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The Court imposed a "clear and
convincing" standard of proof only on defendants seeking to show that they were ineligible
for the death penalty, rather than innocent of the underlying offense. See Sawyer, 505 U.S.
at 336.
84 Moreover, the statute provides that the innocence showing is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the consideration of a new claim in a second or successive habeas
petition; the petitioner must additionally show that "the factual predicate for the claim could
not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence .... " 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(2)(B)(i). In contrast, the Court had ruled that a colorable innocence claim was a
sufficient condition for an exception to its limitations on successive petitions-an alternative
to a showing of "cause" for failure to have raised the issue in previous submissions, rather
than an additional requirement. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 496.
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B).
86 The statute requires proof of innocence of the underlying offense rather than innocence
of the death penalty, proof by the higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence,
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This judicial and legislative re-calibration of the availability of federal
habeas corpus relief was part of a larger movement to make the accurate
determination of guilt or innocence the paramount or exclusive value in
constitutional criminal procedure.
If Judge Friendly's Is Innocence
Irrelevant? spurred and reflected a new outlook on habeas corpus, Judge
Marvin Frankel's speech and article, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, published five years later, reflected the changing zeitgeist regarding
the criminal process.87 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts moved on many
fronts to repudiate or limit the Warren Court's view of the criminal process
as an appropriate venue for addressing claims of police and prosecutorial
misconduct or for promoting abstract values (such as dignity, fairness, or
equality), when vindication of such claims or values would come at the
expense of accuracy in criminal trial verdicts. Many doctrines, too
numerous to canvas, reflect this shift in constitutional criminal procedure
toward limiting the vindication of constitutional values other than, and in
tension with, verdict accuracy. Perhaps the most obvious example is the
Fourth Amendment context, where the Court repeatedly cut back on the
remedy of evidentiary exclusion, trading off again and again the value of
incremental (in the Court's view) deterrence of police misconduct for
88
greater accuracy of criminal dispositions.
For death penalty reformers and abolitionists, however, two related
doctrines generated during this truth-seeking revolution ought to be of
particular concern: the constitutional doctrines regarding the right to
effective assistance of counsel (Stricklandv. Washington89 and its progeny)
and the duty of prosecutors to disclose potentially exculpatory information

and a proof of innocence in addition to, rather than as an alternative to, a showing of cause
for failure to develop the factual record in state court.
87Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975). While Frankel was more concerned with the roles of lawyers and judges in the
adversary process than with the field of constitutional criminal procedure, his admonition
that the trial process had moved too far from the central mission of truth-seeking struck a
chord; his article, originally given as a lecture to the New York Bar Association the previous
year, was immediately cited by Justice Powell in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 n.25
(1976).
88See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (fashioning an exception to the
exclusionary rule for good faith reliance on the issuance of an invalid warrant); United States
v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (permitting the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence to
impeach a testifying defendant at trial); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (reformulating
the doctrine of Fourth Amendment standing to seek exclusion of evidence); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976) (limiting the invocation of the exclusionary rule on federal habeas
corpus review); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (permitting the use of
unconstitutionally seized evidence in the grand jury).
89 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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(Brady v. Maryland9 ° and its progeny). The current "innocence revolution"
has taught us that failures of trial counsel and suppression by the state of
exculpatory evidence are two of the primary causes of the conviction and
sentencing to death of innocent people. 91 Yet the ex post "reasonable
probability" of acquittal standard promulgated during the other "innocence
revolution"-as both the "prejudice" prong of the Strickland analysis and
the stringent definition of "materiality" in the Brady line of cases-has
proven to be one of the biggest stumbling blocks for capital defendants in
their attempts to present such claims for relief.
The Warren Court, despite its many rulings on criminal procedure,
never offered a general constitutional framework for the consideration of
claims by criminal defendants that their counsel provided ineffective
representation. Finally, in the waning years of the Burger Court, the Court
accepted the constitutional project and decided Strickland, a capital case in
which the defendant argued that his lawyer failed to investigate and present
potentially mitigating evidence prior to and during his sentencing hearing.
The Court, concerned that its new, generalized standard for attorney error
might open the floodgates of litigation and reversal, held that convictions
(and capital sentences) should remain undisturbed even when defendants
could demonstrate that their counsel's performance fell below the Court's
deferential bar of reasonable competence, unless such defendants could also
show "prejudice" from specific attorney errors. The Court defined
"prejudice" (citing the developing Brady line of cases) as "a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different," noting that "[a] reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. 9 2 This test was not a new one for the Court; it reflected the
extent to which the accuracy of outcomes had become both the beginning
and the end of constitutional analysis. It is telling that Justice Marshall
wrote for himself alone-without even his usual companion Justice
Brennan-in questioning the ascendancy of verdict accuracy in the
formulation of the Strickland prejudice standard:
[T]he assumption on which the Court's holding rests is that the only purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel is to reduce the chance that
innocent persons will be convicted. In my view, the guarantee also functions to
ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures. The
majority contends that the Sixth Amendment is not violated when a manifestly guilty

90 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
91 See Warden, supra note 67, at 403 n.94 (citing Armstrong series in Chicago Tribune).
92 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976)).
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defendant is convicted after a trial93 in which he was represented by a manifestly
ineffective attorney. I cannot agree.

Marshall urged instead that the government should bear the burden of
proving that incompetent lawyers were "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt," the general standard for other forms of constitutional error during
criminal trials.94
Marshall was also the dissenting voice (this time with Brennan), on
similar grounds, when the Court used the same "reasonable probability"
standard to define the scope of prosecutorial duties to disclose exculpatory
evidence 95 under Brady, the case in which the Warren Court first announced
a general prosecutorial duty to disclose under the Due Process clause.
Brady, like Strickland, was a death penalty case. 96 The Court reversed
Brady's death sentence because the prosecutor had failed to disclose to the
defense a statement by Brady's companion during the offense admitting to
the actual killing (while still implicating Brady as an accomplice).9 7 The
Court's opinion, holding that "material" exculpatory evidence must be
turned over to the defense by the state, did not offer a definition of
"materiality" other than such evidence as "would tend to" exculpate the
defendant or reduce the penalty. 98 In later cases, however, the Burger Court
sharply circumscribed the definition of "materiality," ultimately referencing
Strickland and concluding that undisclosed exculpatory evidence is
"material" only "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 99
Once again, Marshall took the Court to task for creating too high a bar
for relief. He castigated the Court for being too "anxious to assure that
reversals are handed out sparingly"' 00 and urged that values other than
accuracy ought to trump the preservation of guilty verdicts. Marshall
appealed to the need to shape a more disinterested role for prosecutors in
the adversary system and thus to avoid creating incentives for prosecutors
to "play the odds."' 0' He argued that the general structure of the adversary

93 Id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18

(1967).

95
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985).
96
Brady, 373 U.S. 83.
97 id.
9' Id. at 88.
99 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
1oo Id. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'o' Id. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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system and "equality of justice"' 0 2 depended on the government sharing
exculpatory information with defendants, regardless of the outcomes 0of3
particular cases. And he squarely urged that sometimes the "apparent"'
fairness of trials ought to matter, even when there is no showing that a
defendant is either innocent or actually harmed by the government's
misconduct. In urging automatic reversal for deliberate prosecutorial
failures to disclose exculpatory evidence, Marshall argued that such
misconduct is "antithetical
to our most basic vision of the role of the state in
10 4
the criminal process.'
This sketch of how the now-familiar landscape of constitutional
criminal procedure and habeas corpus review developed is not meant to
suggest that anyone concerned about the execution of innocent people today
necessarily endorses all or any of these particular doctrines.
Rather,
consideration of this earlier "innocence revolution" offers some cautions
that might temper, at least a little, the wholesale commitment of current
death penalty reformers and abolitionists to an innocence strategy. First, a
lesson for reformers. Many hope that the "random audit"' 0 5 function of
DNA analysis will lead to a greater understanding of systemic problems in
the criminal justice system that need reform and a greater willingness to fix
them; their hopes are buoyed by the interest that policy makers, including
the Illinois legislature, recently have shown in addressing issues like
identification procedures and standards for capital defense counsel. But the
debate over the reform of federal habeas corpus teaches that concerns about
innocence can just as plausibly be used to promote the creation of special
procedures only for those who can assert the possibility (or probability) of
factual innocence rather than the maintenance of far more costly general
protections for all defendants. If technological advances hold out hope that
such "special procedures" exist or might soon be developed in capital cases,
enthusiasm for general procedural reform may well dissipate.l16
Second, and more globally, we are worried that the current focus on
innocence may implicitly concede the lesser power of other systemic
critiques. Larry Marshall, a towering figure in the current "innocence
revolution," celebrates the fact that innocence is so uncontested a value,
especially in comparison to the Warren Court's "controversial set of value

102

Id. at 695 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).

103 Id. at 693

(Marshall, J., dissenting).

104Id. at 704 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As in the Strickland context, Marshall urged

the Chapman constitutional harmless error standard for non-deliberate failures to disclose
potentially exculpatory material. Id. at 696.
105
Rosen, supra note 70, at 69.
106 See infra Part

IJI.C.
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judgments pursuant to constitutional values of autonomy, integrity, and
respect for the individual.' ' 7 While it is impossible not to see his point and
share the relief of having an argument whose central premise is
unquestioned, we hope that the Warren Court's premise that some values
trump accuracy survives (even if we don't embrace the particulars of all of
its doctrinal innovations). Contrary to many eloquent critics of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure revolution,'0 8 we are not convinced that reorienting constitutional criminal procedure around accuracy is so obviously
right. We think that there are good reasons to empower criminal defendants
with the ability to challenge police and prosecutorial misconduct, racial
discrimination and disparity, and structural inequities in the criminal
process, even when such challenges might undermine the validity of
otherwise accurate criminal convictions. While focusing on innocence as a
strategy does not preclude championing such challenges, it can make it
harder to confidently or persuasively argue--or even think-them.
Moreover, the source of such challenges is limited to the capital and
criminal defense bars and the legal academy. If they channel the bulk of
their time, energy, and material resources toward innocence
claims and
09
strategies, other systemic critiques may be weakened or lost.'
One could fairly respond that the Warren Court decisively lost its
battles; why urge the defense bar and the academy to waste their time
fighting the last war? Wouldn't a more fruitful strategy be to hoist the
Court by its own petard and urge doctrinal and public policy reforms
centered around the new paradigm of innocence? This, too, is a fair
point, 10 but such a strategy might fail to recognize that there are vestiges of
a counter-paradigm that still remain, which could become more vulnerable
if the new paradigm were to gain complete ascendance. Consider one
important example: claims for reversal of convictions in cases of race
107 Marshall, supra note 66, at 573.
108 See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES

(1997).

109 We thus turn on its head Bill Stuntz's fear that the Warren Court's recognition of

greater procedural rights shifted limited defense resources away from investigating and
pursuing claims of factual innocence. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997). We worry
that focusing too exclusively on individual claims of innocence may drain energy away from
larger systemic critiques.
110 This is exactly the sort of argument that one of us made regarding the cognizability of
"bare innocence" claims on federal habeas review. See generally Jordan M. Steiker,
Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L. REv. 303 (1993) (arguing that the Court's
willingness to craft federal habeas as an equitable remedy without strict adherence to
statutory language supports an argument for the cognizability of innocence as a claim
independent from constitutional error).
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discrimination in the selection of jurors and grand jurors have escaped the
Court's usual demands for proof of some demonstrable effect on the
verdict. Rather, in the peremptory challenge context, the Court emphasized
the need to allow criminal defendants to seek remedies for discrimination
against racial minorities excluded from their juries because of the
importance of protecting "public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice.""' Even more extraordinarily, the Court has repeatedly refused to
apply its usual harmless error principles to racial discrimination in the
selection of the grand jury," 12 even when a properly selected trial jury
convicted the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt of murder, maintaining
that such discrimination "'strikes at the fundamental values of our judicial
system and our society as a whole.""'1 3 This latter holding generated a
vehement dissent by Justice Powell, one of the strongest proponents of the
innocence paradigm in federal habeas and constitutional criminal
procedure, contending: "The Court does not adequately explain why grand
jury discrimination affects the 'integrity of the judicial process' to a greater
extent than the deprivation of equally vital constitutional rights, nor why it
is exempt from a prejudice requirement while other constitutional errors are
not." ' 14 Powell puts his finger on the discordance between the Court's
emerging innocence paradigm and some vestiges of the Warren Court's
counter-paradigm emphasizing racial justice. These scraps of an alternative
vision need to be defended and nurtured in advocacy-before courts, and
before public policy-makers and the court of public opinion-lest they be
discarded as the ill-fitting remnants of a clearly outmoded way of thinking.
The extent to which such an alternative vision has become
subordinated to the new innocence paradigm is reflected in the title (and
substance) of an article by Steve Bright, one of the country's premier
capital defense lawyers and abolitionist advocates. Bright's Is Fairness
Irrelevant?" 5 is a play on the title of Judge Friendly's famous Innocence
essay and reflects just how powerful Friendly's vision has become.
Bright's call for a jurisprudence focused on fundamental fairness in
procedures for racial minorities, the mentally handicapped, and the indigent,
be they guilty or not, is exactly the kind of "push-back" that we need to
counter the increasing dominance of the new innocence paradigm, but it is

111Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986).
112 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 (1986) (citing previous cases).
113Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979)).
114Id. at 271 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115 Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas
Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to ProtectFundamentalRights, 54
WASH.& LEE L. REv. 1 (1997).
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also the kind of analysis that can be subordinated to or even weakened by
the siren call of appeals to the problem of innocence. Bright, like other
abolitionist advocates, has naturally begun to highlight the issue of
innocence, 1 6 but there is some uneasy tension between such arguments and
more traditional arguments about fair procedures and the possibility of
redemption. We worry that too much enthusiasm for and emphasis on
innocence may play a supporting role in rendering other values apparently
"irrelevant."
B. INNOCENCE PROJECTS AND THE UNDERMINING OF TRADITIONAL
PUBLIC DEFENSE VALUES
The preceding section outlines our fear that too vigorous an embrace
of the "innocence revolution" might skew both the analysis and advocacy of
the defense bar and the academy, two key sources of critique of the
administration of capital punishment. An additional fear, elaborated in this
section, is that the institutional mechanism by which the "innocence
revolution" has proceeded might have an unintentional but unavoidable
negative impact on the fragile capital and criminal defense bars. At first,
the "innocence revolution" proceeded in an ad hoc fashion, as revolutions
are wont to do. The famous and oft-told story of Anthony Porter's
exoneration by journalism students is an example of the fortuity of some of
the early cases.' 7 In recent years, however, there has been an explosion of
"innocence projects" modeled on the path-breaking Innocence Project of
Cardozo School of Law founded in 1992 by Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld, both former public defenders themselves. The Cardozo project
has been hugely successful in using DNA testing to expose erroneous
findings of guilt, responsible for well over 100 DNA exonerations of
convicted inmates to date." 18 There are now forty-two other "innocence
projects" in the United States, 1 9 some of which follow the Cardozo model
of pursuing only DNA exonerations, but most of which pursue innocence
claims by traditional evidentiary means, as well. 20 A substantial majority
of such projects are, like the Cardozo project, either run by, housed at, or
116 Stephen B.

Bright, Will the Death Penalty Remain Alive In the Twenty-First

Century?: InternationalNorms, Discrimination,Arbitrariness,and the Risk of Executing the
Innocent, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1 (2001).
117
118

See Warden, supra note 67, at 422 app. A.
See Thomas Adcock, Innocence Project Expanding Its Horizons, LEGAL

TIMEs,

Dec.

29, 2003, at 9 (project claims responsibility for 140 exonerations).
119 See The Innocence Project, at http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/index.php
(listing innocence projects by state).
120 See Daniel S. Medwed, Actual Innocents: Considerations in Selecting Cases for a
New Innocence Project,81 NEB. L. REV. 1097, 1106 & 1106 n.32 (2003).
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affiliated with law schools.1 21 Despite the undisputable fact that the work
done by the original Innocence Project and many of its progeny has been
extraordinary in its quality and absolutely breath-taking in its results, the
proliferation of the institutional form of the law school-based "innocence
project" raises some troubling issues within the larger world of criminal and
capital defense.
First, consider the effect of the existence of such projects on attorneyclient relationships in individual cases and on the issue of client trust in a
public defense system more generally. Ellen Suni, a law professor and cofounder of the Midwestern Innocence Project, has written a thoughtful
article on ethical issues raised by the distinctive relationships established by
"innocence projects" with their clients. 22 While the precise nature of such
relationships varies across projects, they are almost always more limited
than full-fledged criminal defense representation. Suni's article addresses
and proposes some solutions to thorny issues relating to confidentiality,
conflicts of interest, and duties of zealous representation raised by
"innocence" representation. The concerns we seek to raise here are related
to, but distinct from, those Suni addresses. Our concerns are not focused on
the application of existing ethical rules to this new form of representation;
rather, we are worried that the proliferation of such limited representational
relationships-especially if they outlast the DNA revolution-will create
problematic (even if "ethical") attorney-client relationships that may
undermine trust in criminal defense relationships more generally.
The most problematic aspects of the relationships forged by the
innocence projects are their limited and conditional nature. Many projects
take on only those legal claims predicated on the claimant's total innocence
of the crime charged and terminate the relationship if it is determined that
the claimant has no colorable innocence claim. Thus, actual or potential
clients whose claims turn out to be only partial or purely legal defenses
(that might establish that the grade of their convicted offense was too high
or might mitigate their punishment or might undermine only the legal rather
than the factual basis for their conviction), if they are not initially screened
out by an innocence project, may have their non-innocence claims ignored
or abandoned mid-stream. As Suni points out, innocence projects can avoid
or ameliorate ethical issues posed by such limited representation by not
taking on formal representation of a client at all or by delaying formal
representation until the case is sufficiently screened for innocence and
121See Jan Stiglitz et al., The Hurricane Meets the Paper Chase: Innocence Projects
New EmergingRole in ClinicalLegal Education, 38 CAL. W. L. REv. 413, 415 n.4 (2002).
122 See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects:An Initial Primer, 70
UMKC L. REv. 921 (2002).
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ensuring that their clients are well-informed of the limits of the
representational relationship.1 23 But from the perspective of the client,
however, no matter how delayed the formal representation or how informed
the consent, there is bound to be some misunderstanding, disappointment,
and sense of betrayal-especially given that the vast majority of potential
"innocence" clients will be indigent and unsophisticated inmates seeking
post-conviction relief without many other possible avenues of legal
representation.
As innocence projects become an established feature of the postconviction inmate assistance landscape, individual inmate experiences of
being screened out by such projects will multiply (whether the screening is
immediate or, more problematically, after a period of investigation and/or
representation). And, as the use of DNA evidence becomes more a part of
the pre-trial rather than the post-conviction world, the screening of postconviction cases for "innocence" will become more difficult, timeconsuming, and subjective, with fewer clear victories. We worry that, in
such a world, relationships between indigent defendants and their unchosen representatives at all stages of the criminal process will become
more problematic than they already are. The lack of trust that already exists
between many indigent defendants and their appointed representatives will
be exacerbated.124 Moreover, many defendants may feel compelled, or
more compelled than they already do, to present themselves as factually
innocent to their attorneys, neglecting or refusing to provide information
that might support powerful legal defenses.
The growth of the innocence project as institution may have
repercussions not only for the attitudes of criminal defendants and inmates,
but also for public defenders as well. Former defenders who now run legal
clinics in law schools have written compellingly of the need that public
defenders have for sustenance in their roles. 25 This need arises in large
part from hostile questioning by members of the public-including other
lawyers-about how defenders justify their zealous defense of the guilty:
Criminal lawyers cannot escape the scorn heaped upon our clients. Some see us as
indistinguishable from those we represent....
Unfortunately, it is not just our
parents' friends at random social gatherings who think this way-it is our friends. It
is the people with whom we have grown up, gone to college, and even gone to law
123 See id. at 960-64.

124 See Victoria Bonilla-Argudo, as told to Mark Pothier, The Advocate, BOSTON GLOBE,
Jan. 9, 2005 (Magazine), at 18 (court-appointed criminal defense lawyer in Boston reporting
that indigent clients "call some of us 'public pretenders"').
125 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain

Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1239 (1993); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The
Callingof CriminalDefense, 50 MERCER L. REv. 443 (1999).
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There is
school-a sad sign of the values being taught in the legal academy ....
seldom admiration. More and more, when they come to understand that we represent
126
our clients proudly and zealously, no matter the accusation, there is contempt.

The hostility and incomprehension that public defenders face will
necessarily be exacerbated by the growth of special-duty public defenders
who represent exclusively innocent clients. As one leader of a traditional
public defense clinic wryly commented on the creation of an innocence
project at his law school, "What should we put over our door-'Guilty
Project'?" Given the criminal justice system's desperate need to recruit and
retain lawyers willing to take on traditional indigent criminal defense, a
need especially acute in death penilty cases, we should be aware and
concerned about the impact that innocence projects might have on such
recruitment and retention.
This concern has particular bite in law schools, where the next
generation of lawyers is inculcated and trained. While innocence clinics no
doubt can and do provide valuable experiences for students, 127 their close
connections with and dependence upon law schools make them an even
more prominent part of legal education than they are a part of the larger
world of criminal justice. While innocence clinics may draw in and enroll
students who would not otherwise consider work relating to criminal
defense, we worry that they might also attract much of the next generation
of public defenders, who will then never be trained in the more traditional
indigent criminal defense clinics run by law schools. The lack of training is
less important than the lack of inculcation in the next generation of
traditional criminal defense values and sustaining narratives. We thus need
to think hard about the motivations, attitudes toward role, and habits of
investigation and legal analysis that innocence clinics may inculcate in
students.
C. LEGITIMATION AND ENTRENCHMENT

We have commented more extensively elsewhere on the dilemma
faced by death penalty abolitionists that reforms that may genuinely
improve the administration of capital punishment also may make it harder
to abolish altogether. 28 The "innocence revolution" presents two specific
applications of this more general concern. First, the current focus on DNA
evidence carries within it the seeds of later legitimization of a "reformed"
126Smith & Montross, supra note 125, at 446.
127See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 120, at 1150 (describing the pedagogical benefits of
involving students in innocence project case screening).
128See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Should Abolitionists Support Legislative
"Reform "of the Death Penalty?, 63 OHIO ST. L. J. 417 (2002).
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death penalty. Second, the rhetoric of innocence is in some tension with the
deepest normative arguments against capital punishment.
The focus of the innocence revolution on DNA exonerations contains
three perils for the future. First, the "random audit"1 29 function of current
DNA exonerations is a time-limited phenomenon. At the present moment,
most highly publicized DNA exonerations are post-trial and appeal, thus
dramatically exposing failures of our criminal justice process to make
reliable determinations of guilt and supporting advocacy for reform of the
justice process and reform or abolition of the death penalty. Each new
exoneration provides a new swell of support for such reforms. As DNA
testing becomes more of an established part of the pre-trial process,
however, there will (thankfully) be fewer and fewer post-trial exonerations.
This inevitable and salutary development, however, may well lead the
public to think that the problem of innocent people on death row is "fixed,"
as there will no longer be any indisputable means of post hoc proof of the
system's fallibility. Jim Liebman has captured this problem beautifully,
noting: "What DNA giveth to the death penalty reform impulse... DNA
reform can taketh away." 130 Liebman also presciently predicted the second
peril-the use of DNA by proponents of the death penalty to salvage capital
punishment by safeguarding it with required DNA testing. 31 This is
exactly the route Governor Mitt Romney of Massachusetts has pursued in
seeking to reinstate capital punishment there, as Joe Hoffmann reports from
his work as co-chair of the Massachusetts Governor's Council in this
symposium.132 Finally, what Liebman sees as a hope for the future, we see

as a third peril of the current focus on DNA evidence in the debate about
innocence and capital punishment. Emphasis on the wonders of DNA fans
the public's hopes and even expectations that there are or soon will be
irrefutable means, available in all or most cases, to "prove" truth outside of
the costly and expensive criminal process. 133 If such means actually are
quickly developed, we agree with Liebman that they might take over the
DNA "random audit" function. But we fear that public hopes and
expectations may well outstrip science for a substantial period of time,
creating impediments to the political will to pour effort and resources into
deep reform of the criminal justice process.
129See Rosen, supra note 70.

130Liebman, supranote 50, at 549.
131 Id. at 547-48.
132 See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Protecting the Innocent: The Massachusetts Governor's
Council Report, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 561 (2005).
133 See Liebman, supra note 50, at 551 (describing new "Hitchcockian" technologies
such as "Brain Fingerprinting").
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At a much higher level of abstraction, we worry that the tone and
rhetoric of a focus on the problem of executing the innocent in debates
about the death penalty is in some tension with the deepest normative
arguments against capital punishment. Those arguments depend crucially
on some notion of the human dignity even of those who are entirely guilty
of heinous offenses, 134 and on some limit to what we are willing to do, as a
self-governing collective, to even the worst offenders. If innocence is cast
as the central problem in capital punishment, then avoiding execution of
innocents becomes the sought-after solution, deflecting the doubts and
hesitations that abolitionists need to nurture about the limits of what
extreme sanctions should be visited on the guilty.
The obvious reply to the foregoing is that the issue of innocence seems
to have a lot more traction among actual people at this point in time than
abstract normative arguments do, so why not use whatever seems to work at
the moment? The reason to hesitate and perhaps hold back just a little is
that the abolitionist movement stands in relation to the deep normative
arguments against capital punishment the way the defense bar stands in
relation to the Warren Court's vision of criminal procedure-each is the
keeper of a rather delicate, unpopular flame, and each has some
responsibility to preserve the valuable parts of its legacy even as it seeks, as
all effective advocates do, to use the tools of the moment to get the job
done.

CONCLUSION

Revolutions in action and in thought are by nature hostile to the
discarded past. They tend to disparage the principles of the old regime and
exaggerate their departures. Change, not continuity, is valued. The
emerging academic, popular, and political focus on the problem of
innocence in the death penalty has the hallmarks of a revolution in this
regard. After years of relative dormancy, the concern surrounding the risk
of executing the innocent has emerged as a defining, perhaps the defining
issue in the national death penalty debate. As part of its ascendancy, the
argument from innocence claims normative superiority because of the
unquestionable values it serves (who possibly supports punishing or
executing the innocent?). It also claims timeless appeal, because any
134 See

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The
State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as
human beings.").
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criminal justice system is inevitably as fallible as the humans who
implement it.

We are genuine admirers of the advocates who have brought claims of
innocence to light and urged widespread reform to prevent such errors. But
we are also mindful of the contingency of the argument from innocence.
We do not believe that the claim of normative distinctiveness withstands
close scrutiny. Nor do we regard the power of the innocence concern to be
timeless; we have sought to demonstrate that its appeal varies with facts on
the ground. We have thus sought to provide normative and temporal
context to the discussion of innocence's role in the capital punishment
debate. We accordingly urge caution in looking to the argument from
innocence as necessarily the strongest, either normatively or strategically, in
seeking reform or abolition of the death penalty.

